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ABSTRACT 
GILLES DELEUZE' S PHILOSOPHY OF ART: THE CRUELTY OF 
AFFECT 
Bülent Eken 
M.F.A. in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assit. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
June, 1999 
In this work the influential contemporary French philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze' s aesthetic theory has been analysed with 
regard to its philosophical origins. Baruch Spinoza, whose 
influence is felt in the whole of Deleuze' s ouevre, proves to 
be the basic figure of his approach to art as well. Gilles 
Deleuze sets out to formulate a vitalist theory of art, the 
scope of which requires that the categories of judgement and 
reception be displaced. This scope situates artistic activity 
in a generalised creativity, where reception and judgement 
find their places as points of break and tension which could 
still be examined within the system of creation. 
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Bu çalışmada çağdaş Fransız filozofu Gilles Deleuze' ün 
estetik kuramı felsefi kökenleri açısından incelendi. 
Etkisi Deleuze' ün bütün yapıtında hissedilen Baruch 
Spinoza, filozofun sanata yaklaşımında da temel figür 
olarak belirir. Deleuze' ün formüle etmeye giriştiği 
dirimaelci sanat kuramı yargı ve alımlama kategorilerinin 
yerinden oynatılmasını talep eder. Bu vizyonda sanatsal 
pratik, alımlama ve yargının kırılma ve gerilim 
noktalarını oluşturduğu genelleşmiş bir yaratım olarak 
belirir. 
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The problem of aesthetics concerns, as its Greek 
etymology testifies, ''sensation'' or ''affection'' with 
all its aspects. Even such a definition is enough for one 
to understand that it is not restricted to what is today 
called art. Sensation, when it is regarded through its 
manifestations in the human sphere, is specifically 
related with the finitude of human existence in the world 
and with the question of the relation of infinite 
structures, which are supposed to exist alongside this 
finitude, with this finite existence. It is true that 
philosophy, even if its singular instantiations testifies 
to the contrary, from the perspective of its historicity, 
tended to overcome aesthetics in favour of isolating 
stable structures of knowledge, politics and ethics and 
with the result of marking an ideal of art. What we may 
witness, today, in the sphere of the so-called human 
sciences and philosophy, is the critical attempt to 
pursue the traces of aesthetics operating in the 
construction of the structures that we mentioned. 
Although this might constitute interesting attempts with 
their highly aporetic conclusions, a positive 
undertaking, which would necessarily focus on singular 
instantiations of the problematic in order to make 
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already send to the future forces of differentiation is 
more urgent. If a reason was asked for the necessity of 
such an activity, the reply would be that there is no 
such thing as pure critique. The efficacy and power of a 
critique stands and falls with its unforeseeable 
interrelationship with its object and the object that it 
finally becomes. And, this means at least two things: 
existence is objectless, and critique has its expression 
from the self-positing of the activity itself, it is the 
spontaneity of the position. That is why a mere 
discussion on the conditions can remain unaware of itself 
as conditioned by other conditions. 
It is Gilles Deleuze, with a few other names, who 
carried furthest such a positive critique, giving it its 
liveliest configurations. And it was Baruch Spinoza who 
performed a similar task during the shattering periods of 
the Classical thought, a thinking activity that demanded 
the utmost care for the unthought in what is established 
as thinking as such. Deleuze never ceases to acknowledge 
his adıniration to Spinoza, calling him the absolute 
philosopher because he fulfilled the nonphilosophical 
condition of philosophy which makes him, paradoxically, 
the least philosophical of all philosophers. 
This thesis tries to pursue the Spinozian theory of 
sensation within Deleuze' s work in general and his 
position on art in particular. Although Deleuze kept 
direct reterence to Spinoza in all his work, Deleuzian 
critica have not considered this track with detail. 





interpretation. That, on the contrary, both philosophers 
undermine interpretative activity is what I will try to 
show below. Therefore, rather than being an exegesis of 
Deleuze's theory of sensatian and his thinking on art, my 
study tries to outline his Spinozian lineage through a 
close investigation of Spinoza' s aesthetics as it is 
elaborated in his major work Ethics. 
The first chapter investigates the components of 
this theory. Because it has a very complex organisation 
frequent reference to his book is maintained. 
The second and third chapters are organised around 
the topics that seem to me to be the most powerful 
affects expressed by Deleuze' s thinking on art. Namely, 
judgement and reception. 
In the second chapter, I tried to make visible the 
existential and semiological conditions of judgement as 
regime that has its own plane of organization and its own 
presupposition of a disorganized state. And I tried to 
show its relationship with the Spinozian theory of 
affects. 
In the third chapter there is an attempt to displace 
reception in art from a Deleuzian perspective. Or, more 
truly the question of ''What might be the status of 
reception, and viewer, in such a theory of sensation?'' 
is pursued. To open up the stakes about the topic I 
referred to Lyotard' s influential position. 
I must say that the choice of the topics of the 
second and third chapters has no ultimate necessity to a 




their choice derives from my affection of neıeuze' s 
work. That is whY in the first chapter I mostly referred 
to neıeuze' s reading of Spinoza rather than any other 
reading. And this chapter anticipates, 1 believe, a lot 
that is in the subsequent chapters. 
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2 SPINOZA: AESTHETICS OF CREATION 
We are hesitant to talk about an account of 
aesthetics or sensibility that would be elaborated by 
Spinoza. Not because he lacks one, but because what 
should be said of his Ethics, that it might as well be 
titled Politics, Ontology, Aesthetics, or Physics, yet 
one cannot talk about Spinoza' s philosophy of politics, 
or aesthetics, or his ontology, should also be said for 
the particular subject matters in the Ethics. For, if we 
are concerning ourselves here with his account of 
aesthetics, in order to cast some light over Deleuze' s 
various positions on art and his concerns in the artistic 
practice, we cannot but note that its place cannot be 
restricted; his work in its entirety appears as a general 
theory of aesthetics, in which the term aesthetics can be 
substituted by the term affection for the reasons of 
terminological consistency. It would be a gross error, 
for example, to take imagination, which Spinoza reserves 
~~ 
for his first kind of knowledge, as the appropriate place 
to determine artistic activity, and discuss the scope of 
art works. For, not only does imagination represent, as 
its definition also suggests, an epistemological state 
(inadequate ideas), referring to a certain composition of 
power (the dispositian of the body determined by the 
''indicated'' presence of an external body, in relation 
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to agreement or disagreement of natures), and defining a 
certain political type (fool, or powerless as the one who 
is a prey to his passions); but it also is in a constant 
relationship of reciprocal conditioning with the two 
other kinds of knowledge (reason and intuition), and with 
their respective corollaries on these same points of 
knowledge, power, politics. 
These problems are worked through in what is 
generally known as Spinoza' s monism, which is summarised 
by the famous first principle ''a single substance for 
all the attributes.'' Deleuze recasts this principle to 
avoid any simplification as follows: ''To make body a 
power which is not reducible to the organism, to make 
thought a power which is not reducible to consciousness. 
Spinoza' s famous first principle (a single substance for 
all attributes) depends on this assemblage and not vice 
versa.'' (1987: 62), but in order to come to terms with 
the real orientation of this principle it is necessary to 
deal with the complex mechanism presented in the Ethics. 
2.1 Idea and Immanence 
Let us begin with the Spinozian canception of the 
idea. However, adetour from Plato's canception of Idea 
will not only serve as a guide to determine two different 
constructions of ~he same concept, but also reveal two 
very important notions, ie. Immanence and selection, the 
difference in conducting these concepts might be seen as 
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regulating, throughout the history of philosophy, the 
positions of different philosophers for and against 
transcendence. This theme of the difference of conduct 
before immanence, as the ultimate trait of the 
philosopher, haunts Deleuze' s entire work. The presence 
of Plato within the context of discussion seems to me to 
be justifying my recourse to him here. 
Deleuze presents the motivation of Platonic doctrine 
of Ideas as conditioned by two apparently contradictory 
demands: the invocation of an order that is immanent to 
the cosmos, and the refusal of the barbarian 
transcendence. Greek philosopher is not the Eastern sage 
who formally pessesses wisdom, he becomes the friend of 
wisdom who confronts rivals who are now seen as free and 
are positioned in an equal distance of demand for the 
same wisdom in question. The philosopher, therefore, has 
to assess their laying claim to knowledge. Choosing the 
truthful and legitimate claimant without committing 
violence to the friendship demands that the concept 
should exist in a time which has the form of anteriority; 
that truth already pre-exists. 
He puts time into the concept, but it is a time that 
must be Anterior. He constructs the concept but as 
something that attests to the pre-existence of an 
objectality [objectite], in the form of a difference 
of time capable of measuring the distance or 
closeness of the concept' s possible constructor. 
Thus, on the Platonic plane, truth is posed as 
presupposition, as already there. This is the Idea 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 29). 
7 
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The full scope of the theory of ideas, which 
develops in a scenario of ''the Father, a double of the 
father, the daughter, and suitors'' (ibid, 30) - the 
Father being the Idea that possesses the daughter 
firsthand, his doubles as the legitimate participants or 
claimants, and the suitors as false pretenders1 -
culminates in the invention of a new transcendence: 
He will have to invent a transcendence that can be 
exercised and situated within the field of immanence 
itself. This is the meaning of the theory of Ideas. 
And modern philosophy will continue to follow Plato 
in this regard, encountering a transcendence at the 
heart of immanence as such. The poisoned gift of 
Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into 
philosophy, to have given transcendence a plausible 
meaning (the triumph of the judgement of God) 
(Deleuze, 1997a: 136-7). 
The final formulation of Platonic Idea is, thus, 
this: the theory of Ideas is organised as a dialectic of 
rivalry, which operates as an apparatus of selection 
between truthful claims (judgement), and whose 
functioning is made possible by introducing transcendence 
into immanence - the sign of transcendence is, 
therefore, immanence' s being made immanent to something 
else; rather than its being immanent to itself. Within 
these coordinates, Idea is a phenomenon of height. 
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In the conclusion of the above mentioned article, 
Deleuze raises the question of whether a reaction to 
Platonism and its transcendence abandons the Platonic 
selection, or constructs different methods of selection. 
Deleuze finds this possibility in Spinoza and Nietzsche. 
We will return to this point after presenting the 
Spinozian conception of idea. 
The definition of idea, in Ethics, might seem to 
bear no originality, or suggest no difficulty in 
understanding, at first sight: ''By idea, I mean the 
mental conception which is formed by the mind as a 
thinking thing'' (Ethics, II, def. 3). When it is read, 
however, together with the definition of the body, just 
at the top of the same page, and the third axiom of the 
next page, it is understood that we need subtle and 
complicated terminological distinctions: ''By body I mean 
a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner 
the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an 
extended thing'' (~, II, def. 1}. ''Modes of thinking, 
such as love, desire, or any other of the passions, do 
not take place, unless there be in the same individual an 
idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea can 
exist without the presence of any other mode of 
thinking'' (~, I I, ax. 3) . 
In a first determination idea is a mode of thinking 
that is primary in relation to other modes of thinking. 
That this primacy does not derive from conferring any 
privilege over the idea will become clear from the 
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account of parallelisrn of body and rnind. But before that, 
the phrase ''expression'' that appears in the definition 
- that it ''expresses in a certain deterrninate rnanner the 
essence of God'' in so far as he is an extended thing 
already points toward a chiasrnus of body and rnind. The 
necessary explanations in order to account for the nature 
of this interrningling will be found in the explanations 
of substance, attributes and rnode. 
Substance, Nature or God designates, in Spinoza, the 
only free cause, because it is the cause of itself (self-
cause), whose essence necessarily involves existence, and 
whose conception can be found independently (~, I, def. 
3). Attributes constitute the infinite essence of 
Substance, and substance consists in infinite attributes 
expressed in its eternal and infinite essentiality (~, 
I, def. 4 and 6). Though attributes are infinite in 
number, nurnerical distinction thereby being irrelevant 
for thern, and is rnerely an abstraction of ours, the only 
attributes that we know are extension and thought. It is 
for this reason that the definition of attribute is given 
by Spinoza as ''that which the intellect perceives as 
constituting the essence of substance'' (~, I, def. 4). 
Infinite intellect and the idea of God will therefore 
play an irnportant role in the exposition of Spinozian 
rnonisrn; ie. episternological and ontological parallelisrns 
of body and rnind. And, rnode is ''the rnodifications 
(affectiones) of substance, or that which exists in, and 
is conceived through, sornething other than itself'' (~, 
lO 
I, def. 5). Modes, therefore, cannot be free causes, and 
the type of causality that they are involved in can only 
be a necessary chain of causality which opens itself up 
to infinity. 
The autonomy of body and mind, or rather the fact 
that the chain of necessary causality which they enjoy in 
existence as being autonomous because of their belonging 
to two different attributes, would remain incomplete, if 
it was not added that, from the point of view of essence, 
they belong to one and single substance, the modes of 
which exist in the attributes. Therefore, expressian is 
never lacking at each moment in such a way that it 
fulfils the requirements of absolute, at the level of 
modes as well; but one can still detect inadequacy in 
respect to the encounter of bodies, at the level of 
modality. This absolute that is in question is an 
absolute without totality; and the modality of the modes 
that are in question are infinitely finite. Deleuze 
points to this aspect: 
Spinoza repeatedly underscores the irreducibility of 
the modes to mere fictions, or beings of reason. 
This is because the modes have a specificity that 
requires original principles (for example, the unity 
of diversity in the mode, Letter XXXII, to 
Oldenburg) . And the specificity of the mode has to 
do less with its finitude than with the type of 
infinite that corresponds to it (1988: 92). 
What is an idea, then? If we are going to reply to 
ı ı 
this by anticipating what we will expose below, the 
following chain of equivalence will appear: I have an 
idea of something whenever I regard \perceive \ affirm an 
external body as present. But, presence for me is only 
the affection of my body, therefore ''the object of the 
idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other 
words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, 
and nothing else'' (B, II, prop. 13). As such; idea 
involves the nature of the affected body, and indicates 
the presence of affecting body (''involves'' and 
''indicates'' being related to the dimension of 
''expression'', of course); the body or mode, or the 
''individual'' that now appears under a new composition 
formed of the encounter of these two bodies is itself an 
affection of substance. It is a part of substance because 
it exists in the attributes that constitute the essence 
of substance, which means that affections are modes 
themselves. Substance being one and indivisible, body and 
mind are one and the same thing, now seen under the 
attribute of thought, now under the attribute of 
extension. ''Each thing is at once body and mind, thing 
and idea; it is in this sense that all individuals are 
animata'' (Deleuze, 1988: 86). 
We have said that Plato' s basic move was to 
introduce transcendence into the immanence. But, it is 
necessary to recall the steps of this move: making time 
the form of anteriority, which doubles the concept and 
makes possible the vertical fall-and-withdrawal of Idea. 
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If, for example, the concept in question is virtue, the 
one who is virtuous is not the one through whom virtue 
will be realised, he must be the one who has never been 
anything other than virtuous, therefore the virtue of the 
first one, instead of realising what is virtuous, becomes 
virtuous ''according to'' the virtue of the second whose 
virtue always judges without itself being allowed to be 
judged. It is the same with the fate of immanence. 
Deleuze and Guattari seems to have touched this veritable 
point with a fine formulation: 
Instead of the plane of immanence constituting the 
One-All, immanence is immanent "to" the One, so 
that another One, this time transcendent, is 
superimposed on the one in which immanence is 
extended, or to which it is attributed ... (1994: 
44) . 
Such is the confusion of the concept with the plane. 
Of course, in Plato cogito could not arise; time being a_ 
form of anteriority, reasoning did not have the speed of 
reflection yet; it contemplates. It is with Descartes, 
and after him with all the philosophy of reflection that 
consciousness will become a site of immanence, immanence 
being immanent to a thinking subject. Each time with an 
invented time, and making immanence ''extended to ... '' 
Perhaps, Spinoza is the only example to measure the 
distancing and nearing to immanence, for whom time is 
radically lost, and space is constituted dynamically as 
extensive envelopment of intensity (essence expressed in 
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existence; existence assembling essence). The material of 
the idea being found not in a representative but in an 
expressive content enabled Spinoza to avoid constituting 
the plane of immanence as a field of consciousness. This 
immanent destination of idea is therefore what we are 
going to deal with. 
2.2 Monism; the Parallelism of Mind and Body 
When establishing the chain of equivalence in 
defining the idea above, we proceed from the ''ideas that 
we have''; that is, the ideas that we have in a lived 
duration which define what happens to our body. But we 
must also proceed, as it were, from the inverse 
direction, seeing that we reached to the substance that 
we are as its affections. Besides, therefore, the ideas 
that we have, there are also ''the ideas that we are'', 
in so far as substance is the cause that produces every 
thing and idea. In his proofs Spinoza uses two different 
syntaxes as if to account for the double aspect of the 
ideas we mentioned. He talks about God' s being the cause 
of an idea not in so far as he constitutes the essence of 
our mind, but in so far as he is the cause of an idea 
that we have, the cause of which is an other idea, whose 
cause is, in turn, an other idea, and to infinity {in 
such a way to correspond with the infinite attribute of 
thought); and in a similar way, God is the cause of an 
14 
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actually existing body not in so far as he is the cause 
of the actual reality of it, but in so far as he is 
regarded as affected by some mode of extension, in which 
one body is the cause of an other, the cause of which is 
an other body, to infinity (which corresponds with the 
infinite attribute of extension). But, there are also 
such statements as God is the cause of the essence of 
things, because he is not only the cause of their 
existence, but also their essence; and God constitutes 
the essence of mind in so far as there is an idea that 
corresponds to it which is in him. We can say that these 
point towards a veritable perspectivism: the perspective 
of inadequacy (the ideas that we have) , and that of 
adequacy (the ideas that we are; which are necessarily 
adequate because they are in us as they are in God) ; the 
perspective of duration (an abstracted conceptualisation 
of existence) , and of eternity (existence conceived as 
such, as an eternal truth) . 
What does it mean to ''have'' the idea of God, for 
example? The importance and problematic nature of this 
question becomes clear if one considers what must already 
have been clear from what has been said: that is, in 
Spinoza, God' s power is not like that of a tyrant or 
king, that he does not act by the freedem of will, and 
that his understanding, or intellect, is not such that he 
pessesses the knowledge of something that he is capable 
of being not producing (all of which indicates the break 




blamed for atheism, and which in his eyes are mere 
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric abstractions of men) . 
Book One of his Ethics is mainly an attempt to undermine 
these illusions. 
Wherefare the intellect of God, in so far as it is 
conceived to constitute God' s essence, is, in 
reality, the cause of things, that both of their 
essence and of their existence. This seems to have 
been recognised by those who have asserted, that 
God' s intellect, God' s will, and God' s power, are 
one and the same. As, therefore, God' s intellect is 
the sole cause of things, namely, both of their 
essence and existence, it must necessarily differ 
from them in respect to its essence, and in respect 
to its existence. For a cause differs from a thing 
it causes, precisely in the quality which the latter 
gains from the former (E, I, 17, note; emphasis 
added) . 
Given that this explanation asserts that God' s 
understanding should be seen as one with his realised 
power of action, and his necessity of existing, are we 
going to say that in so far as we ''have'' the idea of 
God, we know all through him, and know all about him? 
For, according to a central proposition of the Second 
Book of Ethics, ''an infinite number of things follow in 
infinite ways'' from the idea of God, which ''can only be 
one'' (prop. 4). We must add to this another proposition: 
''The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal 
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and infinite essence of God'' (~, II, prop. 48). And we 
must recall that the ideas that we have are always 
inadequate in so far as they represent what happens to 
our body; since we are not the cause of this idea, this 
idea indicates the state of our body plus the presence 
and the effect of an external body; when, on the 
contrary, we become the cause of an idea, as a condition 
of its being adequate, it is explained by our essence, or 
power of knowing, and it expresses another idea as its 
cause, and the idea of God as determining this cause. The 
ideas that we are are necessarily adequate; since they 
are in God, and he is the adequate cause of these. But, 
we see that the ideas that we have can also be adequate. 
Inadequacy defines the first kind of knowledge, which 
Spinoza calls imagination, and adequacy defines the 
second kind of knowledge, which is called reason, and 
which is the condition of passage to the third kind of 
knowledge called intuition (Cf. ~, II, 50, note). In 
order to make clear what has been said, we can pay 
attention to the structure of the idea: an idea 
represents something that exists in an attribute 
(objective reality of the idea), and it is itself 
something that exists in the attribute of thought (form, 
formal reality of the idea) (Cf. Deleuze, 1988: 86). 
From the perspective of causality, this leads to the 
distinction between formal cause and material cause: 
formal cause refers to a logical power, a power of 
comprehension and explanation, which does not reduce the 
objective reality of the idea in its being present in us; 
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that is, our being conscious of it; material cause refers 
to an expressive content, which frees the objective 
reality of idea being found in its representing 
something; because the material cause of an idea is an 
other idea in the attribute of thought. Deleuze 
formulates this in a subtle way: 
The form of the idea is not sought in a 
psychological consciousness but in a logical power 
that surpasses consciousness; the material of the 
idea is not sought in a representative content but 
in an expressive content, an epistemological 
material through which the idea refers to other 
ideas and to the idea of God. Logical power and 
epistemological content, explication and expression, 
formal cause and material cause are joined in the 
autonomy of the attribute of thought and the 
automatism of the mind that thinks. The adequate 
idea represents something truthfully, represents the 
order and connection of things, only because it 
develops the order of its forms and the automatic 
connections of its material in the attribute of 
thought (1988:75). 
To have the idea of God, therefore does not mean to 
know everything pertaining to him, because we can only 
know what we are involved in - thought and extension -
and it does not serve as a common notion in itself 
(common notions defining the ideas of reason); because, 
as Deleuze says, it is inseparable from its formal and 
material assembling, and as the note to the 48th 
18 
proposition that we mentioned above clearly indicates -
where Spinoza says that it is generally the abstractions 
of imagination that determine the idea of God for human 
beings. 
The importance of the idea of God derives from its 
constitutive relationship with common notions, the 
elaboration of epistemological and ontological 
parallelism, and the passage from inadequate to adequate 
ideas, which is, in turn, as we will see, inevitable for 
the theory of- affects, and the selection between the 
affects. 
To conclude the account of parallelism, we will show 
the function of the idea of God in the passage from 
epistemological to ontological parallelism in order to 
satisfy all the demands of monism. The theses of 
epistemological and ontological parallelisms are, 
respectively, these: according to the first one, the idea 
and its object in a different attribute form one and the 
same ''individual'', according to the second, modes under 
all attributes form one and the same modification (or, 
one and the same affection for all modes) (Cf. E, II, 7, 
note) . The principle of the first parallelism can be 
found in the Spinozian conception of causality, which was 
related in the note to the 17th proposition of the First 
Book of Ethics we quoted above, and according to which a 
cause, in order to be a cause, remains in itself, and an 
effect, in order to become an effect, separates itself 
from the cause. By this way, according to an isomorphism 
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(identity of order), isonomy (equality of principle), and 
isology (identity of being) between mind and body, idea 
and what it represents forms one and the same individual 
in terms of their causation. The principle of the second 
parallelism, however, is different and difficult. Why 
does the mind perceive only the modifications expressed 
through extension, if all modes under all attributes form 
one and the same modification? If a single affection 
traverses substance in which we are in harmony, why is 
all this appearance of dissension? Of course, our answer 
will not be the solution of this question; partly because 
this is not a question but an answer. If, then, ''this 
cannot be solved'' is the answer, this answer belongs to 
nobody, precisely because nobody ceased to come with 
questions from another answers; but not everybody did 
this with the same strength of desire and same force of 
the attempt to affirm existence2 . And the greatness of 
Spinoza lies in the fact that he has a veritable 
suggestion about the ''composition'' of the strength of 
desire and the forces of affirmation. 
What enables the passage from epistemological to 
ontological parallelism is the idea of God. We know why. 
Because, it must be understood objectively; God's power 
of existing being accompanied by his power of 
comprehending all that follows from his power or essence; 
and this objectivity must be accompanied, in turn, with 
the requirements of the formal reality of the idea. Which 
means nothing less than that the idea of God must be 
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formed; that without this condition it cannot become a 
common notion, and that the task of fulfilling this 
belongs to the composition of the existing modes. This 
explains the modal status that is given to the idea of 
God; ie. it is only a mode of the attribute of thought; 
that is, God cannot essentially be defined as a thinking 
being, but absolute power of thinking belongs to his 
essence. And, it also explains the privilege given to the 
attribute of thought, being ''the entire objective 
condition which the absolute power of thinking pessesses 
a priori as an unconditioned totality'' it can, by the 
intermediation of the idea of God, transfer unity from 
substance to the modes, although at the level of 
ontological parallelism all the attributes, including 
thought, are equal as forms of essences and forces of 
existence (Deleuze, 1988: 98). By this exposition the 
entire Ethics can be seen as a theory of power. And, this 
will enable us to engage with modal essence and 
existence, which will have importance for some problems 
peculiar to art. 
2.3 Power 
If, the full scope of the distinction between the 
kinds of knowledge is designed to enable a distinction in 
terms of the strength of thought displayed by each kind -
logical power surpassing consciousness, expressive 
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content keeping representative content in a constant 
state of tension - and, if a bodily dispositian 
corresponding to the state of power represented by 
thought is searched by means of the theory of the 
parallelism of mind and body, this is because, divine 
essence or Nature can be read in terms of power 
(potentia). From what has been said until now, it was 
clear that thinking is not a privilege of a moral 
subject, in so far as all modes of thinking derive 
necessarily from the absolute activity of Nature, 
imagination as well as reason. We have seen that the 
apparent breaks at the level of modality could form an 
integral part of the substantial continuity. And, this 
becomes clearer when it can be seen that the apparent 
moral or intellectual hierarchy can be written in terms 
of a natural hierarchy; a hierarchy of power. 
2.3.1 Affection, Affect 
First of all, a terminological adjustment. In so far 
as modes are affections of substance, affections 
(affectio) are modes themselves. These affections are 
necessarily active, in so far as substance is the only 
free cause and explains their nature. Affections are also 
the modifications of modes, they designate what happens 
to them. This ''happening'' that takes place between 
modes canbenamed with a minor Spinozian concept: 
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encounter. One body encounters an other body. Affection 
of a human body with an external body involves both the 
nature of human body as affected, and the nature of 
external body as affecting, and the idea of this 
affection represents the external body as present until 
the body is affected in such a way so as to exclude the 
existence of the said external body (g, II, prop. 16 and 
17). Presence for the human mind is strictly tied to 
affection, and there is no negation in the mind (such as 
pertaining to will and judgement) save that of the idea. 
These affections are images, corporeal traces, or signs. 
And, Spinoza says that the mind imagines when it regards 
things in this fashion3 (g, II, prop. 17). In so far as 
alive, then, humans cannot stop imagination, since they 
cannot stop the encounter with external bodies, which 
means that they are essentially open to affections. One 
might be tempted to interpret this as men being 
ultimately prey to inadequate ideas, and that one cannot 
be said to be more perfect than an other, and one idea is 
not more perfect than another idea. But, this is not the 
case; and as might be understood from the above argument, 
the perfection or reality (which are taken as synonymous 
terms in Spinoza [g, II, def. 6]) does not consist, in 
Spinoza, in the once and for all cancellatian of 
imagination and inadequacy, which is impossible; it 
demands a change in nature, in perspective, and in power 
which is real. The theory of affects will serve to this 
aim. 
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Now, image affections, or ideas constitute a state 
of the affected body and mind; the perfection, reality, 
or capacity of action cannot be separated from the 
duration in which they are experienced, which means that 
they designate a more or less perfection than the 
preceding state. Spinoza names these passages, 
transitions, whereby the activity of power of the body 
diminishes or increases, affects (affectus) m., III, def. 
3) . 
The most important aspect concerning affects is the 
nature of difference between them and affections. 
Although affects-feelings derive from image-affections as 
their cause, affects are not representative; they 
designate the passage from one represented state to 
another, in terms of the correlative variation of the 
affecting bodies. In the third book of Ethics, which is 
in its entirety devoted to the derivation and definitions 
of affects, Spinoza suggests that there are, with the 
addition of desire, only three affects to which all the 
others can be traced back; namely, pleasure, pain, and 
desire. The nature of desire gets an explanation from the 
principle of conatus. Conatus is the endeavour of every 
being to persevere in its existence (g, III, prop. 6); 
whereby it constitutes the actual essence of the said 
thing (ibid. , prop. 7); it involves an indefinite time, 
since the modal essence, (which, as a degree of power and 
an intensive part, agrees with all the other elements of 
essence) is only determined, qua this essence, as conatus 
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when it comes to exist. This is why the parts that agree 
in intensity no longer agree in the elements of existence 
- therefore existence determined by duration within 
eternity as an indefinite duration with a beginning but 
not a determined end (ibid. , prop. 8). Finally, the mind 
is conscious of this endeavour, whether it has adequate 
or inadequate ideas (ibid. , prop. 9). Desire is this 
appetite of affirming existence (not tending to pass into 
it) with consciousness thereof, which is the cause of 
this consciousness (because ''in no case do we strive 
for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we 
deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing 
to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long 
for it, or desire it.'' (ibid. , prop. 9) ) . 
Pleasure defines ''a passive state wherein the mind 
passes to a greater perfection'', an increase in the 
capacity of acting; and pain defines its contrary, 
passage to a lesser perfection, a decrease in the same 
capacity (g, III, 11, note). The same note defines 
pleasure and pain in reference to body, as stimulation 
(titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas) in the case of 
pleasure; suffering or melancholy in the case of pain. 
But with one reservation; stimulation and suffering are 
valid for parts of the body which are more affected than 
the rest, while merriment and melancholy are valid when 
all parts of the body are alike affected4 . When it 
happens that there is a good encounter between two bodies 
there is an increase in the power of acting, because 
there is established a relationship that expresses two 
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bodies as one under a single composition. When the affect 
of pleasure turns back on the idea from which it follows 
it becomes love, and the affect of pain becomes hatred. 
Love and hatred are, thus, defined as ''pleasure ore pain 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause'' (g, III, 
ll. , note). Although, pleasure still being a passion -
the idea about the thing I love being in me, and the 
cause of this idea being an external cause that checks 
the adequacy of the feeling and the idea it presupposes -
its indication of an increase prepares for a different 
distinction between passions and actions, and production 
of ''active joys'' - there is never an ''active pain, or 
sadness'', since sadness indicates a decrease in the 
activity. Such active joys arise from adequate ideas, 
whereby the formal possession of our power gives us a 
power of thinking, ideas of which express the essence of 
the affecting body in its agreement with our essence 
through the essence of Nature - because, the formal 
presence of the idea of agreement does not search for an 
object to be agreed; just like we deem something good 
because we desired it, agreement indicates a stage where 
there is a turnover in the affirmation of existence from 
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an n power. These ideas give rise to internal joyful 
affects. And this is the third kind of knowledge, 
intuition, to which Spinoza reserves the word 
Blessedness. 
The real scope of imagination is infinite, it is 
checked, held in tension by infinity. I should emphasize 




imagination the widest possible topology, let alone 
trying to expel it. It affirms the highest love of signs 
in their "process of composition, decomposition, and 
genesis'', let alone trying to do away with them. This is 
very different from the Kantian transcendental 
imagination and its teleology of ''as if''; because it 
satisfies the condition of the transcendental within 
immanence without any teleology: the passage between two 
immanent states being transcendental itself. 
2.4 The Mechanisms of the Affect 
... my humanity does not consist infeeling with 
men how they are, but in enduring that I feel with them. 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo 
Having said the difference of nature between image-
affections and feeling-affects, it must be shown in what 
way the Spinozian inventory of affects differs from an 
alternative designation of them as, as it were, 'states 
of mind'. It seems that Spinoza wants to prevent a 
psychological misinterpretation of his theory of affects. 
In the appendix added to the Third Book of Ethics, titled 
'The Definitions of Emotions' 5 , where he returns to a 
summary (re)explication and naming of affects, he 
emphasises that they must be understood in the way he 
defines them and not in the way they are understood by 
the people: 
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I am aware that these terms are employed in 
senses sornewhat different from those usually 
assigned. But my purpose is to explain not the 
meaning of words, but the nature of things. I 
therefore make use of such terms, as may convey 
my meaning without any violent departure from 
their ordinary signification (~, III, def. of 
emotions, 20). 
This can become clear if we just dwell on a single 
example. As it will be remembered love was pleasure 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause. This idea-
affection can have as its content anything that indicates 
an increase in the capacity of action (pleasure) which 
determines an action (desire) that has its object as 
good. The state that this affection constitutes the 
actual essence of the said individual necessarily defines 
a perfection, which means that neither the pleasure, nor 
the desire nor what is regarded as good have in 
themselves perfection. Even in the contrary case of 
hatred-pain-bad combination, the state constituted by the 
affection as essence is perfection. The difference lies 
in the transition from a less to a greater perfection or 
from a greater to a less one. This transition can have 
incredible speed and combinations, in such a way that 
there is no affect save than that of singular 
relationships of motion and rest, due to which no 
calculation for the constitution of a moral subject is 
possible. Among other things, this means that names are 
lacking for affects. In fact this explains negatively the 
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constitution of a moral subject: one will have to use a 
very limited number of names for what happens to him 
which, in fact, demands infinite filtering. Let us take 
as an example the affect of cruelty. For Spinoza 'the 
nature of things' under this affect that 'is called' 
cruelty is as follows. When someone conceives that 
another whom he hates loves him, he will go under the 
conflicting affects of hatred and love. If hatred 
prevails he will try to injure the lover by whom he is 
loved. He cannot directly injure the lover because even 
if he hates him, he at the same time has a conception 
that he loves him. The affect of cruelty is in itself 
revealing because, whereas he usually uses two persons, 
Spinoza here introduces three persons for the 
demonstration. No one tends to take cruelty on oneself. 
Therefore the demonstration becomes more legible when i~ 
is reconstructed from the perspective of the lover: the 
cruel is the one who tries to do injury to the one we 
love, without any reason at all. 
But who is the one that we love? The first note to 
the 4lst proposition of the Third Book of Ethics, in 
whose second note Spinoza opens up the issue of cruelty, 
strongly encourages a Nietzschean answer: Man himself, 
that which Nietzsche calls the internalization of man. 
If anyone conceives that he is loved by 
another, and believes that he has given no 




If he believes that he has given just cause for 
the love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. 
and note) ; this is what most often happens 
(III. xxv.), and we said that its contrary took 
place whenever a man conceives himself to be 
hated by another. (See note to preceding 
proposition.) This reciprocal love, and 
consequently the desire of benefiting him who 
loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to 
benefit us, is called gratitude or 
thankfulness. It thus appears that men are much 
more prone to take vengeance than to return 
benefits (~, III, 41 and note; emphasis added) 
If reciprocity in love, let alone defining 
blessedness for which love is without expectation of 
benefit, points toward a nature more prone to take 
vengeance, then this is all the more explanatory for the 
creditor-debtor relationship within cruelty. For, the 
cruel is not ''evil'' in his activity conceived as the 
capacity and strength of his body, his activity appears 
bad only when it is associated with the image of 
something hated. If love was supposed, for a moment, 
perfection or good in itself, then it should be said that 
not only the lover, but the cruel-loved as well acts 
through love (with the conception of his being loved) . As 
we will find Nietzsche saying, the equation ''injury done 
can be paid off by the pain suffered'' precedes ''the 
criminal deserves to be punished because he could have 
acted otherwise.'' But how could this strange equivalence 
possibly emerge? By means of which ''person met person 
for the first time, and measured himself person against 
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person'' (Nietzsche, 1994: 39). It presupposes that 
... man must first have learnt to distinguish 
between what happens by accident and what by 
design, to think causally, to view the future 
as the present and anticipate it, to grasp with 
certainty what is end and what is means, in 
all, to be able to calculate, compute -and 
before he can do this, man himself will really 
have to become reliable, regular, automatic 
[notwendig], even in his own self-image, so 
that he, as someone making a promise is, is 
answerable for his own future! (Nietzsche, 
1994: 39) 
It lies in indebtedness, responsibility, and ability 
to make promises. It was again Nietzsche, with 
incomparable lucidity and ingenuity, who formulated this: 
The debtor, in order to inspire confidence that 
the promise of repayment will be honoured, in 
order to give a guarantee of the solemnity of 
his promise, and in order to etch the duty and 
obligation of repayment into his conscience, 
pawns something to the creditor by means of the 
contract in case he does not pay, something 
which he still 'possesses' and controls, for 
example, his body, or his wife, or his 
freedom ... The equivalence is provided by the 
fact that instead of an advantage directly 
making up for the wrong (so instead of 
compensation in money, land or possessions of 
any kind), a, sort of pleasure is given to the 
creditor as repayment and compensation, -the 
pleasure of having the right to exercise power 
over the powerless without a thought ... (ibid, 
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44) 
There is nothing surprising in hearing that pain 
gives pleasure to someone who infliets or eontemplates 
it. This testifies to the veetoriality of the affeet. 
Beeause pain, whieh is a reaction, is replaeed by 
pleasure in so far as it is aeted upon. The ereditor' s 
pleasure, then, eonsists in aeting upon the pain caused 
by the debtor, in ease that he does not pay. There must 
not be any eonfusion here. For Nietzsehe, the ereditor 
does not presuppose or reeognize the debtor. The ereditor 
is the powerful; and it is in him that responsibility, as 
the privilege of keeping the standard of value animated 
by the memory of the will, eonseienee, and justiee 
emerge. He eneounters the other with his power, being its 
own criterion, whieh at the same moment puts the other in 
the position of debtor, as the one who elaims to share 
the right to make a promise. That is why punishment, 
eoneerning its purposes and the variety of its purposes 
throughout the history, is said to be ''absolutely 
undefinable''. And yet he openly rejeets the idea of its 
being exeeuted beeause the misereant was held 
responsible: 
Throughout most of human history, punishment 
has not been meted out beeause the misereant 
was held responsible for his act, therefore it 
was not assumed that the guilty party alone 
should be punished: -but rather, as parents 
still punish their ehildren, it was out of 
anger over some wrong whieh had been suffered, 
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directed at the perpetrator, -but this anger 
was held in check and modified by the idea that 
every injury has its equivalent which can be 
paid in compensation, if only through the pain 
of the person who injures (Nietzsche, 1994: 
43) . 
''Out of anger over some wrong which had been 
suffered'' writes Nietzsche. It is as if the creditor has 
already a memory of the debtor; but there is precisely no 
exchange between parties; no exchange of feeling. On the 
contrary, the creditor pessesses a measure to calculate 
the feeling. But what is that? A piece of affect, a 
feeling: pleasure; the pleasure of having the right to 
make him suffer, once the challenge of justice is 
accepted. Which should be understood as the pleasure that 
arises from acting upon a pain whose recollection and 
resemblance codes what is to be avoided. 
This is the system of affects, the system of 
cruelty. There is no judgement here, just like there is 
no signification. This is a senseless cruelty. The 
question of meaning will arise with the internalization 
of pain and suffering. That is why Spinoza says he is not 
concerned with the meaning of words; and that is why 
Nietzsche says this soil, the soil of cruelty, is not the 
place where ''bad conscience'' emerges. 
Bad conscience emerges after an irreducible break, 
after the emergence of State on the spot. Whereby the 
feeling-affect is delegated to a state of mind; guilt, 
duty, love is moralised and idealised. That is why ''the 
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one we love'' is man; who is everywhere but is found 
nowhere. True, the names are lacking for affects, but the 
system of cruelty consists in ''eating the name''; hence 
its cannibalism. But, 
It should not be thought that a semiotic of 
this kind functions by ignorance, repression, 
or foreclosure of the signifier. On the 
contrary, it is animated by a keen presentiment 
of what is to come. It does not need to 
understand it to fight against it (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987: 118). 
Will we conclude, then, seeing that cruelty implies, 
in the last instance, for Spinoza, the desire sullied 
with hatred such that it remains in the paranoid circle 
of bad conscience; and that the only solution is to 
sharpen the intelligence, and salvation through reason? 
And, seeing that Nietzsche shows the place bad conscience 
fertilises as reason, the calculation of instincts, 
intellectualisation of pain, will we conclude that this 
is the point where Nietzsche and Spinoza diverge? This is 
not the case. Spinoza does not give an intellectualist 
account of affects and desire. There is no direct path to 
reason from pleasure and love. Spinoza merely wants to 
emphasise that one needs to select; and this is first of 
all because one has always already selected and has been 
selected: power to power, affect to affect, person to 
person. 
Nietzsche' s allusion to Spinoza, in his On the 
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Genealogy of Morality, shows us that we have another 
opportunity to discuss the apparent difference between 
the two philosophers. Even if, it is where Nietzsche 
seems to underiine Spinoza' s ''intellectualism.'' 
Pursuing the thread of discussion he opened on the 
purpose of punishment, and having stated that punishment 
cannot function as to make someone feel guilty, Nietzsche 
questions the place of morsus conscientiae (''bite of 
conscience'', which is rendered ''disappointment'' in the 
Elwes translation of Ethics) in Spinoza in relation to 
the parallelism of feeling of the wrongdoers about the 
same topic. I will quote, here, the whole section, in 
order to, highlight the stakes of the argument. 
Spinoza became aware of this in a way that made 
him show his true colours (to the annoyance of 
his critics, who systematically attempt to 
misunderstand him on this point, Kuno Fischer, 
for example), when one afternoon, rummaging 
around among who knows what memories, he turned 
his attention to the question of what actually 
remained for him, himself, of that famous 
morsus conscientiae -he who had relegated good 
and evil to man' s imagination and angrily 
defended the honour of his 'free' God against 
blasphemists who asserted that God operates 
everything sub ratione boni ('but that would 
mean that God is subject to fate and would 
really be the greatest of all absurdities'). 
For Spinoza, the world had returned to that 
state of innocence in which it had lain before 
the invention of bad conscience: what had then 
become of morsus conscientia? 'The opposite of 
gaudium,' he finally said to himself, '--a 
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sadness accompanied by the notion of a past 
event which turned contrary to expectation.' 
Eth iii, Propos. xviii Schol. i ii. For 
millennia, wrongdoers overtaken by punishment 
have felt no different than Spinoza with regard 
to their 'offence': 'something has gone 
unexpectedly wrong here', not 'I ought not to 
have done that'--, they submitted to punishment 
as you submit to illness or misfortune or 
death, with that brave, unrebellious fatalism 
which still give the Russians, for example, an 
advantage over us Westerners in the way they 
handle life. If, in those days, there was any 
criticism of the deed, it came from 
intelligence, which practised criticism: we 
must certainly seek the actual effect of 
punishment primarily in the sharpening of 
intelligence, in a lengthening of the memory, 
in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, 
to go about things more circumspectly from now 
on, in the recognition that one was, once and 
for all, too weak for many things, in a sort of 
improvement of self-assessment. What can 
largely be achieved by punishment, in man or 
beast, is the increase of fear, the 
intensification of intelligence, the mastering 
of desires: punishment tames man in this way 
but does not make him 'better', -we would be 
more justified in asserting the opposite. ('You 
can learn from your mistakes' as the saying 
goes, but what you learn also makes you bad. 
Fortunately it often enough makes you stupid.) 
(Nietzsche, 1994: 59-60). 
It is obvious that Nietzsche is not for calculation 
and mastery of desires; but it is less obvious that he 
blames Spinoza for teaching in that way. Could it rather 
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be the opposite? Is not Nietzsche suggesting a 'selection 
of affects' that is perfectly compatible with Spinoza? 
For, it is also obvious that Nietzsche is not for 
''letting go'', cancellation of the ''memory of will'' -
this is clear from the opening pages of his essay, memory 
'is by no means merely a passive inability to be rid of 
an impression once it has made its impact'' (ibid, 39) -
which is actually already played out in the will to 
nothingness of bad conscience. (''Animosity, cruelty, the 
pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying -
all this was pitted against the person who had such 
instincts: that is the origin of 'bad conscience''' 
[ibid, 61]). It was Nietzsche, who wrote in Ecce Homo, 
about the Russian fatalism, the decision ''no longer to 
accept anything at all, no longer to take anything, no 
longer to absorb anything -to cease reacting 
altogether.'' (1989: 230), asa way of ''keeping the 
health'', hygiene, during the periods of decadence. 
''Accepting oneself as if fated, not wishing oneself 
'different' -that is in such cases great reason itself.'' 
(ibid, 231) . We must understand this word for word: 
selection of affects, ceasing to react; this is only in 
order to ''remain healthy''; just like pleasure, for 
Spinoza, is not perfection, that is health, as such. It 
is neither a matter of preferring one affect over 
another, if ''learning from one's mistakes'' were to be 
taken in this sense, and which would indicate being on 
the side of reason, nor advising pure savagery of 
affects. It is a matter of finding other ways of 
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selection than the Platonic way. And, Nietzsche and 
Spinoza are one at this point. Affects are not what you 
think; but what you think can never be separated from 
your affects. The Spinozian doctrine of necessary 
derivation of affects from the absolutely infinite 
substance should be taken very seriously. Assuming them 
as such, as necessary, indicates a threshold in their 
concatenation: the one then sees the light in the shadow; 
through the idea of God in Spinoza, and through the Will 
to Power in Nietzsche. 
We must mention two other aspects by means of which 
the explanation of the non-psychological nature of 
affects gets their full elaboration. The first one was 
already presupposed by and implicated in what we have 
written above; namely that pleasure and pain are 
activities, activities of transition. This is not in 
contradiction with the arguments according to which 
pleasure and pain are passions and there is no active 
pain or sadness -even pleasure becomes activity only when 
it is referred to and caused by adequate ideas. Spinoza' 
s words would leave no doubt on the point. After stating 
that pleasure and pain consist in the transition from a 
less to greater or a greater to less perfection, he 
writes 
I say transition: for pleasure is not 
perfection itself. For, if man were born with 
the perfection to which he passes, he would 
possess the same, without the ernetion of 
pleasure. This appears more clearly from the 
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consideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No 
one can deny, that pain consists in the 
transition to a less perfection, and not in the 
less perfection itself: for a man cannot be 
pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection 
of any degree. Neither can we say, that pain 
consists in the absence of a greater 
perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the 
ernetion of pain is an activity; wherefare this 
activity can only be the activity of transition 
from a greater to a less perfection -in other 
words, it is an activity whereby a man' s power 
of action is lessened or constrained (E, III, 
def. of emotions, 2 & 3). 
It is a strange world, that of Spinoza' s; where one 
always finds himself saying and wondering at, just like 
the narrator in Blanchot' s La Folie du jour, finding 
that he had always been extremely happy even in those 
entirely bad hours, when he believed that he was 
perfectly unhappy (1996: ll). 
The second aspect concerns the status of 
''indifference.'' It would, at first glance, be difficult 
to conceive indifference in such a world of incessant 
activity, where even the breaks themselves have an 
inevitable role. When Spinoza writes that, 
The human body can be affected in many ways, 
whereby its power of activity is increased or 
diminished, and also in other ways which do not 
render its power of activity either greater or 
less (E, III, post. 1) 
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this acceptance of indifference seems to contradict 
the continuous variation of power that is demanded by 
affects. A beautiful taxonomy of bodies given by Spinoza 
as hard, soft and liquid might be evoked here for 
clarification. Spinoza defines hard, soft and liquids 
bodies according to their· contact with larger or smaller 
surfaces, from the perspective of the contact with 
surface, and their liability to change their position, 
from the perspective of movement. But liquid bodies are 
defined as those whose parts are in motion among one 
another (g, II, ax. 3 after prop. 13). So that a liquid 
body can also have the characteristics of hard and soft 
bodies without ceasing to be liquid. Because, liquid 
could also be said to be hard (even the hardest) from the 
perspective of the contact with surface, but liquid from 
the perspective of motion of parts among one another. 
Indifference, seen as conservation of nature within and 
despite affection in many ways, is not incompatible with 
continuous differentiation. 
From another aspect, in so far as it defines the 
absence of variation of power,· indifference is 
lovelessness. But, taken in its positivity, lovelessness 
defines the lack of a law or criterion of love, which 
means that one is always vigilant to the movements of 
love -in other words those of affects. 
We must note that according to these two qualities 
the hypotheses of indifference is in conformity with 
those of the ontological parallelism (''one affection for 
all the modes under all attributes''), and the general 
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anti-teleological orientation of Ethics. That is, God 
does not act for some aim, or for the sake of some good 
particularly for the good of humans. We can, therefore, 
say that indifference concerns less the preservation of 
the nature \ actual being of the body, than the 
affection' s being strictly tied to presence; ie. 
presence of an idea which differs from and contrary to 
other ideas. 
Indifference, then, complements the two mechanisms 
of affects; namely, their anti-psychological and non-
mental nature, and their quality of transitional 
activity. 
Gilles Deleuze' s basic points on the nature of 
artistic creation, his highly selective approach about 
the questions of art and to the artists he handles 
(''which one'' is an artist?); his rejection of a general 
system of fine arts; his attempts to evaluate artistic 
practices as finding their necessity in the thrusts of 
corporeal vitality, which manifests art as a search for 
health; his conception of the artist as the actor of 
becoming and art as the inventory of becomings; his 
elimination of the spectator and reception as categories 
from his theory of sensation; his opposition to a 
linguistic semiology both in literature and in cinema, I 
think, rests on the Spinozio-Nietzschean system of 
affects, along the coordinates that we tried to outline: 
idea as surface effect and as sign; affects as vectorial 
signs that follow according to the variation of power; a 
selective activity of affects which manifests them as the 
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figures of conatus-desire; anti-psychological and anti-
teleological stream of affects which testifies to their 
transitional nature as the correlate of becoming. 
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3 JUDGEMENT 
In what does the system of judgement consist of? It 
seems to us that one of Deleuze' s greatest contributions 
to a pragmatic semiology is that he has done with the 
commonplace according to which judgement is coexistent 
with entry into language, with the fact of speaking -but 
a commonplace that is not innocent, given that its 
stupidity and malevolence constantly works to convey the 
regime, which it actually presupposes as its reason of 
existence, as the only and ultimate one. While talking 
about the system of cruelty as that of the affects, and 
the origin of bad conscience as a necessary complement to 
the internalization of affects, that is their allocation 
to mind as its states, we begged the discussion of a 
whole semiological aspect of the problem. In a very 
general way, it can be said that Deleuze makes use of the 
elements of two ''regimes of signs'', as he names them, 
with Felix Guattari, in their A Thousand Plateaus, in 
elaborating his favourite themes concerning art: 
presignifying semiotic, or the so-called primitive or 
territorial representation; and the countersignifying 
semiotic proper to animal rising nomads and war machine. 6 
In his essay ''To Have Done with Judgement'' (1997c: 
126-35), raising the question of what will be 
distinguished from judgement, Deleuze refers to the 
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system of cruelty in relation to Nietzsche' s work on 
debt, which we mentioned above. As a sign of the 
consistency of theoretical lineage that I articulated 
from Spinoza, I want to quote the abrupt opening lines of 
his essay: 
Kant did not invent a true critique of 
judgement; on the contrary, what the book of 
this title established was a fantastic 
subjective tribunal. Breaking with the Judeo-
Christian tradition, it was Spinoza who carried 
out the critique, and he had four great 
disciples to take it up again: Nietzsche, D.H. 
Lawrance, Kafka, Artaud (ibid, 126). 
What is at stake in the creditor-debtor relationship 
is, simply put, that man recognized himself in man, and 
not in something else. This is a human, all-too-human 
principle; and it is there. But this is not the Hegelian 
master-slave dialectic, because pain is kept in its 
exteriority, giving pleasure to someone who acts on it, 
and it does not signify something above itself. 7 
We must turn to Anti-Oedipus to see why system of 
cruelty, presignifying or non-signifying semiotic, does 
not signify. Its seeret lies in the explanation of why 
savage formations are oral or vocal. 
These formations are oral precisely because 
they possess a graphic system that is not 
aligned on the voice and not subordinate to it, 
but connected to it, co-ordinated ''in an 
organization that is radiating, as it were,'' 
and multidimensional (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 
188) 
In this assemblage there is a triple independence of 
the articulated voice, inscribing hand and the evaluative 
eye. It must be emphasized that the eye sees, and does 
not read the sign inscribed on the body. The voice 
constitutes the action of alliance; the hand that 
inscribes constitutes the body of filiation (passion); 
and the reaction of the eye evaluates, that is, sees the 
declension of the two. Everything in the system, as 
Deleuze and Guattari note, is active, acted upon and 
reacted to.· There is no signification because the 
topological body of alliance presents only codes (and not 
significations) according to the evaluation (and not 
reading) of the eye: a drawing on the wall, a mark on the 
body are parts of the whole territorial body, and 
function as codes of finite blocks of debt; that is a 
series of ''not-to-dos'' for a practiced eye. Hence the 
polyvocality, multidimensionality of the sign. It 
circulates throughout the territory in tune with 
filiational codes thanks to both the autonomy of writing 
and the evaluative eye. As Deleuze re-writes in the essay 
we mentioned, 
One begins by promising, and becomes indebted 
not to a god but to a partner, depending on the 
forces that pass between the parties, which 
provoke a change of state and create something 
new in them: an affect. Everything takes place 
between parties, and the ordeal is not a 
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judgement of God, since there is neither god 
nor judgement (1997c: 127). 
In Anti-Oedipus the emergence of signifying semiotic 
is shown to be coexistent with the irreducible break 
initiated by the emergence of despotic State. The state 
initiates a veritable overcoding, which passes fr~m a new 
organization of the lateral alliance and indirect 
filiation of the territorial regime. What the despot 
overcodes is the primitive voice-graphism-eye triangle, 
in such a way as to make it a base for a pyramid ''all of 
whose sides cause the vocal, the graphic, and the visual 
to converge toward the eminent unity of the despot'' 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 205). 
In the first place, graphism aligns itself on 
the voice, falls back on the voice, and becomes 
writing. At the same time it induces the voice 
no longer as the voice of alliance, but as that 
of the new alliance, a fictitious voice from 
beyond that expresses itself in the flow of 
writing as direct filiation. These two 
fundamental despotic categories are also the 
mavement of graphism that, at one and the same 
time, subordinate itself to the voice in order 
to subordinate the voice and supplant it. Then 
there occurs a crushing of the magic triangle: 
the voice no longer signs but dictates, 
decrees; the graphy no longer dances, it ceases 
to animate bodies, but is set into writing on 
tablets, stones and books; the eye sets itself 
to reading. (Writing does not entail but 
implies a kind of blindness, a loss of vision 
and of the ability to appraise, it is now the 
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eye that suffers, although it also acquires 
other functions (ibid, 205) . 
This is the regime of the signifier, which has its 
own substance of expression: faciality. Given without 
being seen, in such a way so as to bring lack and excess 
together in a single term, the face of the despot not 
only organizes signs into circles but also induces a 
blossoming of circles by way of the constant 
interpretation that is demanded by facial expressions. It 
is here, as Deleuze and Guattari notes, that the question 
'' 'What does it mean?' begins to be heard, and the 
problems of exegesis prevail over problems of use and 
efficacy. The emperor, the god -what did he mean?'' 
(ibid, 206). We can see why debt becomes infinite: voice 
and seeing are doubly depotentialized. The eye suffers to 
read because the sign now becomes the sign of sign, which 
is constituted by the voice of alliance of the despot; 
one cannot speak because what one speaks now is the given 
voice of the despot. Signifier, which abstracts every 
content by formalization, subordinates one' s affects to 
a form, at the same time makes one' s informed forms 
inadequate for one' s affects. The debt is infinite; in 
this Kafkaesque milieu you run from one trail to another 
to be apparently acquitted and find your destiny to be 
. f. . ı d 8 ın ınıte y postpone . 
The parallel to these considerations of Anti-Oedipus 
appears in the ''Judgement'' essay, in the following way: 
47 
In the doctrine of judgement, by contrast, our 
debts are inscribed in an autonomous book 
without our even realizing it, so that we are 
no langer able to pay off an account that has 
become infinite ... At bottom, a doctrine of 
judgement presumes that the gods give lots to 
men, and that men, depending on their lots, are 
fit for some particular form, for some 
particular organic end. What form does my lot 
condemn me to? But also, Does my lot correspond 
to the form I aspire to? This is the essential 
effect of judgement: existence is cut into 
lots, affects are distributed into lots, and 
then related to higher forms (this is a 
constant theme in both Nietzsche and Lawrance: 
the denunciation of this claim to ''judge'' 
life in the name of higher values) (Deleuze, 
1997c: 129). 
In all that has been said, the notian ''overcoding'' 
should indicate one thing: that the territorial body is 
overcoded by the despotic body of the State, that we are 
expelled from our territory does not mean that it has 
been lost. On the contrary, that it is overcoded means 
that we are still on it. Bad conscience, the system of 
judgement and the state are fictions; but this is 
precisely what makes them very effective. According to 
the Spinozian principle ''imaginations do not vanish at 
the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, 
but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, 
supervene and exclude the present existence of that which 
we imagined'' (E, IV, ı, note). What is more, territorial 
representation was also a repression of the great intense 
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germinal flux, the Body without Organs. Now, the 
opposition Deleuze established between the system of 
cruelty and the system of judgement, with respect to 
their divergent and opposing procedures (cruelty versus 
infinite torture; sleep or intoxication versus the dream, 
vitality versus organization, the will to power versus a 
will to dominate, combat versus war), as if to offer the 
former as the antidote of the latter, illuminates an 
important aspect of Deleuze' s philosophy of art. 
As he relates in the beginning of the essay, all the 
four names had personally, singularly suffered from 
judgement and its procedures: accusation, imprisonment, 
deliberation and verdict. This is what makes their work a 
real experimentation: a search for health, a selection of 
affects, combatants as the very ground of a combat that 
passes both against judgement and more importantly 
between the parts of the body of the combatant. 9 The 
theme of art as an enterprise of health, which 
necessarily takes at its disposal becomings, is a 
constant theme in Deleuze, which was elaborated best in 
one of his latest essays, ''Literature and Life'': 
Literature then appears as an enterprise of 
health: not that the writer would necessarily 
be in good health (there would be the same 
ambiguity here as with athleticism) , but he 
possesses an irresistible and delicate health 
that stems from what he has seen and heard of 
things too big for him, while nonetheless 
giving him the becomings that a dominant and 
substantial health would render impossible 
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{1997d: 3; emphasis added). 
This search for health has to pass from the system 
of cruelty because the disorganized body, the body stolen 
by the judgement of God is still alive; still the bodies 
penetrate into each other, inhabit each other despite 
their apparent privatization. And, it is no surprise that 
this process had to potentialize that which has been 
separated from what it can do: vision; as seeing and 
hearing. 
Daniel W. Smith has analysed the results of such an 
understanding of experimentation; taking his departure 
from a passage in the Logic of Sense, he follows the 
paths of Deleuze' s theory of sensation. A passage will 
suffice to give a hint of the project: 
In this case, the principles of sensatian would 
at the same time constitute the principles of 
composition of the work of art, and conversely 
it would be the structure of the work of art 
that reveals these conditions {1995: 29) 
However, we see no exigency to call this procedure a 
''recasting of the Kantian transcendental project.'' All 
the elements of such a theory of serisation, elaborated by 
Smith, can found in a Spinozian reserve. 
Within this framework art becomes the writing of 
materiality itself, a thrust of corporeality. And, this 
has an important impact on Deleuze' s writing strategy on 
art. What he says for his writing practice on the history 
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of philosophy, which consists in producing ''conceptual 
portraits'', ''creating a likeness in a different 
material'', something that one has to produce rather than 
reproducing anything (Deleuze, 1995: 135), could also be 
said for his writing on art. Because, this is the only 
way to escape judgement; because ''if it is so disgusting 
to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, 
but on the contrary because what has value can be made or 
distinguished only by defying judgement'' (Deleuze, 
1997c: 135). 
3.1 The ''Critical and Clinical'' Project 
François Zourabichvili, in his fine essay about the 
notion of ''percept'' in its relation to the critical and 
elinical project, reconstructs the definition of the 
notion: 
What is a percept? Deleuze says: 'a percept in 
becoming' (CC 112}. Not that the perception is 
of a moving object, for it is my perception 
that changes, my power of perceiving rather 
than the way I perceive the object. In what 
sense, then, does it change? What is seeing, 
what is being seen? To see is to potentialize 
sight, to raise it to a second power, to make 
sight itself powerful, while in its ordinary 
employment it is separated from what it can do. 
How does sight regain its power when it becomes 
vision, or percept? When one sees the 
invisible, the imperceptible, or when what 
cannot be seen is perceived: the invisible 
51 
enveloped in what one sees, not as a hidden 
world beyond appearance, but animating sight 
itself from within appearance, or what one 
sees ... What is a percept? A critical-clinical 
perception. Critical because we discern a force 
in it, a particular type of force, and elinical 
because we evaluate the declination of this 
force, its inclination, its ability to fold or 
unfold itself (1996: 189-90). 
For Deleuze, the being of the work of art lies, 
finally, in its being ''a block of sensations, that is to 
say a compound of percepts and affects'' (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1994: 164) If as percepts, the art work 
envelops a force together with its declination and 
inclination, and as affect it preserves the variations, 
in the form of vectors, of the capacity of this force; 
then art criticism, or philosophy of art should invent 
means of evaluation which would not fall behind or black 
what has already been archived by the work of art. 
Evidently, signifying semiotics would not help for this 
aim. Because the art work already presupposes the 
accomplishment of what has been suppressed by this 
semiotics: potentialization of vision, seeing and 
hearing; and active discharge of affects rather than 
their being fitted to a form for an end. This semiotic 
would only work to separate the artwork from what it can 
do. Deleuze names the alternative enterprise ''critical-
clinical'': ''A clinic without psychoanalysis or 
interpretation, a criticism without linguistics or 
signifiance." (1987: 120). It should be noted that 
52 
despotic signifying regime can be a part of a work of 
art. But as we have seen, it presupposes a plane of 
composition, an assemblage and the coexistence of other 
semiotic regimes with different assemblages. What Deleuze 
wants to emphasize is that criticism should regard this 
plurality, and elinical should follow the becoming of the 
lines of this plane; that is the declension of the force. 
Simply put, the disagreement with Lacan, as it appears in 
Anti-Oedipus, was that Lacan seems not to accept the 
reality of different regimes of signs than that of the 
d . 10 espotıc. 
This explains the privilege given to painting in The 
Four Fundamerital Concepts of Psycho-Analysis; which was 
not allowed to the actor, for example. The painter, says 
Lacan, does not wish to be looked at like the actor, who 
embodies gaze and gives something to the eye, if only to 
cause the viewer lay down his gaze: the suffering eye. 
The temporality of the subject in psychoanalysis demands 
that the body which one has to ''map him'' is by 
definition an impossible body: the face of the despot, as 
his whole body, which hides nothing behind the mask that 
the face is. So, does Lacan say that the actor, who is 
already in a geometral space, has nothing to disturb the 
vision of the viewer, because he already is appealing to 
that vision of the viewer? (Lacan, 1977: 100-1) 
But, neither only the painting says, ''You want to 
see? Well, take a look at this!'', nor the actor is 




In a fascinating article, Marguerite Duras opens up 
the i$sue of minority in the context of cinema 
spectatorship. It is obvious, as Deleuze and Guattari 
say, that minorities are not defined by the smallness of 
number: ''A minority can be small in number, but it can 
also be the largest in number, constitute an absolute, 
indefinite majority." (1987: 469). The relations 
internal to the number define minority: is the set 
constituted by the number denumerable (majority), or 
nondenumerable (minority); whereby the characteristic of 
the nondenumerable appears as, not the set or its 
elements, but ''the connection, the 'and' produced 
between elements, between sets, and which belongs to 
neither, which eludes them and constitutes a line of 
flight., (ibid, 470) 
It is for these reasons that Duras begins with the 
indefinite, largest number of minority, which she calls 
''the original viewer'', who goes to movies for 
entertainment, to forget and to escape himself, who 
consists of ''roughly the whole blue-collar population'', 
bricklayers, plumbers, the foreman; but also of ''many 
scientific types'', 
the ones who have studied medicine, physics, 
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film, the ones who have only studied sciences, 
whose studies never diverged from the main 
track, never with anything to vary them, find 
themselves with those who have had a technical 
education or no education at all. Along with 
these people you must consider the vast 
majority of critics, those who validate the 
choice of the original viewer, who sanction 
''personal films'' and defend action films 
adapted to everyone' s taste, and who show such 
hatred for le cinema d'auteur that you can't 
avoid seeing here as well a suppressed anger, 
but of a source other than what is offered as a 
pretext (Duras, 1990: 12-6). 
And, Duras rightly call this vast mass a majority. 
Because of the perfect reason that this mass readily 
links itself up with the disgusting axioms of society and 
capitalism; that is, it remains denumerable, gets easily 
identified in the opinion-polls, in the questionnaires of 
the stupidest TV show: linking itself up with the axioms 
of human rights, it goes to movies to cry before the 
pains of humanity, the ''cruelties'' of the concentration 
camps; linking itself up with the axioms of the social 
bonds of gossiping jolly peoples, to laugh at sexist· 
jokes, ''to rediseover the thing that makes one laugh, 
the thing that will while away the time, the constancy of 
the childish game, the violence of wars, of massacres, of 
riots, virility in all its forms, the virility of 
fathers, of mothers, from every angle, the good old 
laughs on women, the cruelties, the sex life of others.'' 
(ibid, 13). 
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Duras does not say that her viewers, who range 
between fifteen and forty thousand, are a minority. But, 
she says that it is an important figure; and adds her 
fear of finding the young filmmakers, who are 
''inconsolable at not going beyond the thirty-thousand-
people mark,'' one day ''doing anything to reach the 
three-hundred-thousand mark to catch up with that figure, 
the one that ruins, and that will ruin them.'' And, we 
can call this number of viewer minority; not because, 
again, it is smaller; but because it is nondenumerable. 
Constituted by those who are found in the majority, but 
only in the process of a departure from it, therefore 
already in the process of becoming something else with 
the connections between sets that belong to none. And, 
that is why Duras cannot talk about them; because she 
does not recognize them. But, remains the slogan of 
minority: ''If I am fewer in number, I arn just as 
inevitable, just as irreducible.'' (ibid. 14) 
As for the ''original viewer'', the majority, Duras 
says all that can be said: 
This viewer, I think, we must leave to hirnself. 
If he rnust change, he'll change, like everyone, 
all at once or slowly from words overheard in 
the street, from being in love, from sornething 
he's read, from sorneone he's rnet, but alone. In 
a solitary confrontation with change. (ibid, 
16) 
From now on, everything is left to becorning. 12 
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4.1 The Community of Affects 
There are good reasons to start a discussion on 
reception in art with the question of minorities. Because 
reception always has to do with community and 
communication. 
It is Jean-François Lyotard who gave new openings to 
the problem of reception within an articulation of 
Kantian premises. We will closely examine his essay, 
''Something Like Communication ... Without Communication'' 
(1991: 108-19), in order to assess his relevance for the 
issue, but also to assess the differences between it and 
the Deleuzian track we are pursuing. 
These are the basic points of his essay and the 
problems he related them with: 
1) Against the theories of communication, according 
to which communication is intersubjective confrontation 
and interactivity, Lyotard invokes the Kantian notion of 
communicability, which necessarily precedes the mediation 
of understanding as being its condition, and points 
toward a community of feeling (sensus communis), that 
differs in its im-mediacy, as the correlate of the im-
mediacy of communicability, from any psychological, 
social, pragmatic or generally anthropological community: 
This communicability, as a demand and not as a 
fact, precisely because it is assumed to be 
originary, ontological, eludes communicational 
activity, which is not a receptiveness but 
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something which is managed, which is done 
(ibid, 109). 
2) This communicability, as it appears in the 
judgement of the beautiful, defines a passibility, which 
''as the possibility of experiencing (pathos) presupposes 
a donation. If we are in a state of passibilty, it is 
that something is happening to us, and when this 
pasibility has a fundamental status, the donation itself 
is something fundamental, originary (ibid, lll). And 
''all representations presuppose space and time as that 
by which something happens to us and which is always here 
and now: the place and the moment. It has to do not with 
concepts but simply with modes of presentation (ibid, 
111-2) . And, Lyotard relates this donation to the matter 
of sensatian in Kant, who called it big X; and to 
Heidegger' s Being. 
3) Lyotard, then, questions the possibility and 
status of aesthetic feeling, within the frameworks of 
communicability and sensus communis, when it issues from 
the calculated, that is conceptual, re-presentation of 
the new techne, the techno-scientific world. It is here 
that he detects an attack to space-time as the form of 
donation. And, it is here, again, that he invokes the 
Kantian sublime, which bring to fore the form-less, the 
cancellatian of the immediate communicability. The 
failing of space-time with its corresponding Heideggerian 
notion of the retreat of Being. Only ''conditions'' of 
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space and time remain now. And this shows, for Lyotard, 
the importance of the avant-gardes which, as if it is a 
response.to the techno-scientific, get to work on 
conditions of space and time. This is the situation of 
the one without donation, ''the painting of the 
fateless.'' 
4) Lastly, Lyotard warns against a confusion between 
passible and passive. Whereas passivity is opposed to 
activity, passibility is not. In fact passive \ active 
opposition presupposes passibility. After noting that, in 
Kant, with the sublime, passibility does not disappear 
but becomes ''a passibility to lack'', he concludes with 
the questions of the status and meaning of the here-and-
now under the influence of the new technologies in 
relation to art. 
By this schema, Lyotard, strongly challenges the 
humanist ideology of communication by illuminating what 
it is that lies behind the celebrated ideas of 
''interaction'' and the autonomy of the receiver. This is 
still the Cartesian model of mastery: 
The aim nowadays is not that sentimentality you 
still find in the slightest sketch by a Cezanne 
or a Degas, it is rather that the one who 
receives should not receive, it is that s\he 
does not let him\herself be put out, it is 
his\her self constitution as active subject in 
relation to what is addressed to him/her: let 
him\her reconstitute himself immediately and 
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identify himself or herself as someone who 
intervenes (ibid, 117). 
And, he also shows that there is a corporeal 
communality, constituted by passibility, preceding all 
forms of sociality that might be invoked by choice. He 
brilliantly opposes the demands of interactivity, the 
pitiful little ideology of demanding assent: ''When you 
painted, you did not ask for 'interventions' from the one 
who looked, you claimed there was a community.'' (ibid, 
116) 
But, this schema has also its drawbacks originating 
from its Kantian reserve. First of all, it must be said 
that Spinozian conception of affects as passion meets the 
demands of passibility and does not contradict it. In so 
far as affects inhere ''feeling of power'', the capacity 
for being affected, they do not exclude passibility. 
But, Lyotard, who ultimately develops his 
scenarioization upon the Kantian aporia of sensibility 
and conceptuality, seems not to consider Kant' s 
operations on space-time. This, in a way, concerns the 
legitimacy of the movement Lyotard traces from the 
relevance of space-time to its destruction by techno-
science, and in sublime, to salvage its accessibility by 
acting on the conditions of space-time, which is 
attributed to the avant-gardes. Kant could render the 
conceptual aporetic to the aesthetic, only by making 
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space the form of exteriority, and time the form of 
interiority. That is, as Smith puts it, 
... since he defined the form of sensibility as 
extended space, Kant limited the application of 
intensity to the matter of sensible intuitions 
that come to fill that space. But Maimon, like 
Hermann Cohen after him, argued that since 
space as a pure intuition is a continuum, it is 
th~ form of space itself that must be defined a 
priori as intensive quantity: there is 
therefore an internal and dynamic construction 
of space that necessarily precedes the 
representation of the hole as a form of 
exteriority (which implies that space is 
actualized ina plurality of forms) (1996: 36). 
That is, what Kant invoked with the sublime, he had 
already suppressed in the aesthetics; and conversely we 
can say that sublime could appear by means of this 
suppression only. This has important consequences for the -
discussion of the techno-science and the body Lyotard 
puts forward; together with the seeming indispensability 
of the fate of man via space-time. 
For Spinoza, the ''conditions'' of space-time, if we 
are still going to name them conditions, can only be 
''movement and rest'', which are the conditions of 
sensibility, or aesthetics, as such. They do not 
presuppose space; since being mutually exclusive they 
designate intensive magnitudes whose correspondence would 
be the point zero. In Hermann Cohen' s fine formulation 
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of the problematic, 
Space and time itself, the sensible conditions 
of the unity of consciousness, insofar as they 
represent quanto continua, are constituted as 
continua by the reality of intensive magnitude 
as the condition of thought. Intensive 
magnitude consequently appears immediately as 
the prior condition of the extensive ... Such 
was the necessity that led to the infinitely 
small, positing something that became a unity 
not in relation to One but in relation to Zero 
(quoted in Smith, 1996: 53, note 21). 
And Spinoza writes this in his own way as follows: 
Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps 
in motion, until it is determined to a state of 
rest by some other body; and a body at rest 
remains so, until it is determined to a state 
of motion by some other body. This is indeed 
self-evident. For when I suppose, for instance, 
that a given body, A, is at rest, and do not 
take into consideration other bodies in motion, 
I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, 
except that it is at rest. If it afterwards 
come to pass that A is in motion, this cannot 
have resulted from its having been at rest, for 
no other consequence could have been involved 
than its remaining at rest. If, on the other 
hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so long 
as we only consider A, be unable to affirm 
anything concerning it, except that it is in 
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motion. If A is subsequently found to be at 
rest, this rest cannot be the result of A' s 
previous motion, for such motion can only have 
led to continued motion; the state of rest 
therefore must have resulted from something, 
which was not in A, namely, from an external 
cause determining A to a state of rest (E, II, 
Lernma 3. Coroll. After prop. 13). 
So, Spinozio-Deleuzian position cannot share 
Lyotard' s position on the body that is expressed as 
''but we must not put too much trust in this word, for if 
space and time are hit and attacked by the new 
technologies, then the body is too and has to be.'' 
(Lyotard, 1991:116). It is true that a body is attacked, 
and never been ceased to be attacked; which is the 
organized body. But, this is nothing other than the 
spontaneity of the Body without Organs: its trait of 
working against itself. And, it is highly doubtful 
whether we should retain the notion '' attack '' or 
destruction for this operation. This preference, in using 
the term, can only be the expression of a certain 
perspective. It might be that Lyotard' s position 
involves a certain blindness for Nietzsche' s critique of 
conceiving body as a ''medium'', which was anticipated by 
Spinoza. As it is expressed in the Will to Power: 
The work of art where it appears without an 
artist, e.g., as body, as organization 
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(Prussian officer corps, Jesuit order) . To what 
extent the artist is only a preliminary stage. 
The world as a work of art that gives birth to 
itself - (1968: 419). 
And, echoing this, Deleuze emphasizes, in his work 
on Nietzsche, the error in thinking the body as medium. 
What is the body? We do not define it by saying 
that it is a field of forces, a nutrient medium 
fought over by a plurality of forces. For in 
fact there is no ''medium'', no field of forces 
or battle. There is no quantity of reality, all 
reality is already a quantity of force ... What 
defines a body is this relation between 
dominant and dominated forces. Every 
relationship of forces constitutes a body -
whether it is chemical, biological, social or 
political (1983: 39-40). 
These remarks show us that we might have another 
station for discussing the question of techno-science, 
and the questions posed by it. It seems, it would not be 
an exaggeration to assert that techno-scientific 
apparatus, with all its modifications, is a part of our 
body. This does not mean welcoming the calculated, 
Gestell-ed, sensibility of techno-science;.in a way that 
would recall Baudrillard. In fact, it is important to see 
that all of Baudrilard' s analyses depend on similar 
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premises -but only at the level of premises; we are not, 
of course, comparing Lyotard' s dense philosophical 
oeuvre with Baudrillard' s sociology- with the exception 
that Baudrillard' s thesis consist in a negative 
estimation of recovering passibility, or sensus 
. 13 
communıs. 
What it means, for us, is precisely this: it shifts 
the focus and measure of the questions Lyotard poses as 
those of the techno-science, after stepping to the side 
of the conceptual, once the aporia has been established. 
This has two implications: the category of reception must 
be displaced to the point of irrelevance in the name of a 
general creativity -which is continuous despite apparent 
breaks (the break that is apparently introduced by the 
receiver/spectator: In what does the receiver' s creation 
consist of? This tautological question asks nothing but 
the force of creation, its sense and value) ; in 
conformity with the demands of Spinozian substance. And, 
there should be a double salvaging: of philosophy, which 
is associated with the conceptual, from the model of 
State form, from the State thinkers; and of art from 
their aesthetics; but that aesthetics which is 
constituted by the State form of thought as counterpart 
to its own conceptual. 
It might be that man is late, concerning art, 
compared to Nature. If we remain in the Lyotardian 
schema, we can say that Nature is avant-gardist. And the 
problem of reception expresses, first of all, a 
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perspective: the perspective of the spectator, with 
regard to existence, Nature, as such. This aspect 
concerns the whole problem of art criticism or ~he 
philosophy of art. What does art criticism, in its 
dominant forms, today, do if not the prolongation of what 
is left from the operation of the spectator: separating 
artwork from what it can do? The funny thing is that art 
criticism, above all these, tries to pass for a critique 
of spectator position, its structures ete. Here is the 
linguistic semiotics vis-a-vis the cinema. It seems to us 
that Deleuze' s criticisms of linguistic approaches to 
cinema find their philosophical root in the 
considerations that we tried to count above. The 
essential focus of Deleuze' s criticism on film 
criticism, as it is found in the dialogues of 
Negotiations for example, is that film criticism usually 
finds it enough to deseribe films or ''apply to them 
concepts taken from outside film,'' 
The job of criticism is to form concepts that 
aren't of course ''given'' in films but 
nonetheless relate specifically to cinema, and 
to some specific genre of film, to some 
specific film or other. Concepts specific to 
cinema, but which can only be formed 
philosophically. They are not technical notions 
(like tracking, continuity, false continuity, 
depth or flatness of field, and so on) , because 
technique only makes sense in relation to ends 
which it presupposes but does not explain 
(1995: 57-8). 
67 
This passage also gives clues about the form that 
the aporia of sensibility-conceptuality has taken in 
Deleuze' s philosophy. Deleuze had always kept his 
distance to this specifically Kantian problem. When he 
writes, for example, that ''there is no reason to oppose 
knowledge through concepts and the construction of 
concepts within possible experience on the one hand and 
through intuition on the other. For, according to the 
Nietzschean verdict, you will know nothing through 
concepts unless you have first created them -that is 
constructed themin an intuition specific to them ... '' we 
can also understand the significance of his sentences 
that we find in Cinema 2: The Time-Image, which reads: 
''The theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema, but 
on the concepts of the cinema, which are no less 
practical, effective, or existent than the cinema 
itself" (1989: 280). 
If we were to say a single trait that makes Deleuze' 
s two volumes on cinema different than any other book it 
would be its practical or effective aspect: One can learn 
to make cinema by reading those two volumes. Because what 
it does is to convey the workshop of a given director, 
sametimes of a single film. And, to read these does not 
require more than thinking with the concepts -that are to 
be changed when they are found inadequate- that Deleuze 
created from that film or author only. To create in a 
different material what the artwork creates in another 
material. That is the_only principle. 
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So, what will a community of affects consist in? 
There is no doubt that such a community exists, but in 
such a way that it is (de)constituted by the fluctuation 
of affects. Which means that this community is 
deconstituted by the same mavement that constructs it. 
That this community is not drastically separate from our 
human communities, and that many diverging lines can also 
intermingle within differing perspectives has been 
witnessed by three different, and in themselves perfectly 
complete, studies: ''the inoperative community'' defined 
by Jean-Luc Nancy (1991) i ''the negative community'' that 
Blanchot witnesses (1997) i and ''the coming community'' 
deseribed by Agamben (1993). 
Community is the place of the political, but because 
it is a place that has never ''taken place'' it announces 
at the outset the primary deterritorialization of the 
political, work-lessness (Nancy) i because it makes itself 
felt by the ''demand'' for community whether it exists or __ 
does not this community is both unavowed and negative 
(Blanchot)i and because it consists in this ephemeral 
existence it is already at the threshold, always in the 
process of coming (Agamben) . 
And these enable me to return to the minorities. 
Whenever the issue of reception of art is opened up it is 
announced at the outset that no interpretation can 
exhaust its possibilities, with the guarantee added that 
everyone could have his own interpretation. But on no 
occasion we are informed about the actualizations that 
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are made manifest by these possibilities. On the contrary 
we can talk about a cracked line of creation that enters 
into an impasse here but animated there. Because a 
possibility is always a possibility of a perspective, and 
once it enters into the scope it necessarily has a 
reality whether it is assumed or not. Such was the demand 
of the Spinozian common notions, as concepts, that were 
thought as already given. A person, who is defined by his 
affects, his capacity of acting and his capacity of being 
acted upon, can only be followed in his encounters that 
necessarily makes a change in this combination. A eritic 
is that person only after the film he saw the novel that 
he read; and therefore cannot write on that film or on 
that novel, but can only write with that film or with 
that novel. But here, then, the question becomes which 
one is becoming, which one is becoming a minority, and 
what are his capacities and his dead-ends? 
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5 CONCLUSION 
We talked about formulating different methods of 
selection than the Platonic selection of claims. And we 
found components of such a method in Spinoza and 
Nietzsche, particularly highlighted in their Deleuzian 
reconstruction. A selection of affects that consists in 
following corporeality rather than the demarcation of 
moral and ideal spheres; establishing a cracked but 
continuous line of creation rather than placing 
transcendences within apparent points of break; 
constructing an economy of violence rather than investing 
a juridical system that is allegedly based on expelling 
violence. Deleuze had already given a subtle expression 
to these in the Plato essay: 
Such methods would no longer concern claims as 
acts of transcendence, but the manner in which 
an existing being is filled with immanence (the 
Eternal return as the capacity of something or 
someone to return eternally) . Selection no 
longer concerns the claim, but power: unlike 
the claim, power is modest. In truth, only the 
philosophies of pure immanence escape Platonism 




''Filling oneself with immanence''; this means to 
have the intensity and speed of a fluid body rather than 
the slow or fast movement in extension; ~nd active 
discharge of emotions as affects rather than a 
displacement and resistance of emotions. 
It is not enough to satisfy oneself with a vague 
ideal of art. On the contrary, as we said just in the 
beginning, it is the demand for eternal structures that 
would not be sullied with asthetics that marks such an 
ideal. Plato was in no way against the image; he was for 
a certain image that he thought could be cultivated by 
giving a logic to resemblance and recollection as the 
inner mechanisms of affection. It is with Spinoza that we 
witness resemblance and recollection as the necessarily 
split logic of affects (for resemblance and recollection; 
the propositions 13 to 17 of the Third Book), which 
necessarily envelops the image without resemblance and 
eternity in such a way that substance for a turnover, 
which does not have recourse to transcendence, but on the 
contrary has as its condition expelling transcendence, to 
fill oneself with immanence is never lacking. 
This formulation enabled Spinoza to avoid the 
questions of whether passions should be mastered, or, on 
the contrary, all attempts for mastery should be dropped, 
which troubled Cartesians and empiricists. For, once the 
problem is posed in terms of power the opposition between 
passions and reason becomes an opposition of power to 
power; and power cannot be decided not to conduct its own 
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operations; it is rather that decisions arise out of 
power. 
And, this perspective opens a field beyond object 
and subject. The other, in this field, indicates nothing 
but a set of capacities, a block of affects, a possible 
world. That the object of desire is lost should be 
understood as a radical loss; to such a degree that 
functionality cannot be introduced to desire in order to 
make it a part of the analysis. ''Existence is 
objectless''; this principle could replace the 
alternative phrasings of ''there is no object, or it is 
lost'' and ''it is a fiction, or partly so''. The 
asymmetric reciprocity of affects in reference to their 
agents (or bodily supports) cannot, in this case, be seen 
as subject to subject, or object to object relationship; 
it has to do with becoming that discards objectality even 
if it refers to it in its process. 
· Deleuze sees artists as the travellers of such a 
field. Situating art on a single plane to the degree that 
it cannot be distinguished from the most trivial attempt 
to affirm existence, keeping health, and organization of 
matter, gives it its greatness. Different because same; 
inevitably recognized because same, but unbearable in its 
difference. He, of course, has a strict taste for which 
one that will be the artist; but this is only because not 
to die from indigestion. Man, as our resemblance to 
ourselves, holds us back. But art is the thrust for the 
thing without resemblance and the annihilation of the 
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miserable memory. That is why, Deleuze writes that art 
shows the ''existence of the possible'', liberates it 
from where it enters into an impasse. 
Finally, we can say about Deleuze what he had said 
for Spinoza: 
Writers, poets, musicians, filmmakers -painters 
too, even chance readers- may find that they 
are Spinozists; indeed, such a thing is more 
likely for them than for professional 
philosophers. It is a matter of one's practical 
conception of the ''plan.'' It is not that one 
may be a Spinozist without knowing it. Rather, 
there is a strange privilege that Spinoza 
enjoys, something that seems to have been 
accomplished by him and no one else. He is a 
philosopher who commands an extraordinary 
conceptual apparatus, one that is highly 
developed, systematic, and scholarly; and yet 
he is the quintessential object of an 
immediate, unprepared encounter, such that a 
nonphilosopher, or even someone without any 
formal education, can receive a sudden 
illumination from him, a ''flash''. Then it is 
as if one discovers that one is a Spinozist; 
one arrives in the middle of Spinoza, one is 
sucked up, drawn into the system or the 
composition (1988: 129). 
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NOTES 
ı. To see the elaboration of this dialectic of rivalry 
Cf. Deleuze, 1990:253-266. 
2. On the question ''Who will answer this answer?'', 
see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:110. 
3. To recall what is evident, I am quoting Spinoza: 
The mind does not err in the mere act of 
imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded 
as being without the idea, which excludes the 
existence of such things, as it imagines to be 
present to it. If the mind, while imagining 
non-existent things as present to it, is at the 
same time conscious that they do not really 
exist, this power of imagination must be set 
down to efficacy of its nature, and not to a 
fault especially if this faculty of imagination 
depend solely on its own nature- that is (I. 
def.7), if this faculty of imagination be 
free. (g, II, prop.l7). 
4. The whole psychoanalytic program appears as the 
dechiperment of the privileged organs, or those 
organs, which are over invested with pleasure. But 
for Spinoza organ does not precede the affect, on 
the contrary organ presupposes the affect. 
Psychoanalysis is more Kantian than Spinozian on the 
point of an intense body, it seems. That is, it is 
an empty Idea whose reality is ideal. The main point 
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of critique against psychoanalysis in Deleuze and 
Guattari was the inability of the former of thinking 
the Body without Organs. (Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 
1983: ch.1, and 1987:149-167) This trait of 
dissension also makes intelligible the principle of 
the Body without Organs; 
You have to keep enough of the organism for it 
to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small 
supplies of signifiance and subjectification, 
if only to turn them against their own systems 
when the circumstances demand it, when things, 
persons even situations, force you to; and you 
have to keep small rations of subjectivity in 
sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to 
the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You 
don't reach the BwO, and its plane of 
consistency, by wildly destratifying. That is 
why we encountered the paradox of those emptied 
and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they 
had emptied themselves of their organs instead 
of looking for the point at which they could 
patiently and momentarily dismantle the 
organisation of the organs we call the 
organism. {Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:160-1) 
This is compatible with the relative privilege given 
to pleasure, although it is a passive state. The 
same considerations are what also express the stakes 
in the confrontation with Foucault: in the 
discussion of ''pleasure or desire'': ''I cannot 
give any positive value to pleasure, because 
pleasure seems to me to interrupt the immanent 
process of desire ... '' (Deleuze, 1997b: 5). 
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5. The Elwes Translation that I am using renders 
Spinoza' s affectus as 'emotion'. Deleuze refers to 
this same notion, both in his work on Spinoza and in 
his own work, as 'affect'. For reasons of 
terminological consistency, and in order to keep the 
theoretical emphasis - because emotion might 
sometimes appear in Deleuze as the psychological 
misinterpretation of the nature of affects - I 
prefer using the notion of affect. 
6. These topics are the concerns of the two chapters 
''587 B.C. - A.D. 70: On Several Regimes of Signs'' 
and ''1227: Treatise on Nomadology: The War 
Machine'' inA Thousand Plateaus (1987: 111-49 and 
351-424); and the entire 3rd chapter ''Savages, 
Barbarians, Civilized Men'' in Anti-Oedipus (1983: 
139-273) 
7. ''The meaning of existence is completely dependent 
on it: existence is meaningful only to the extent 
that the pain of existence has a meaning (UM III. 
5). Now, pain is reaction. Thus it appears that its 
only meaning consists in the possibility of acting 
this reaction or at least localising it, isolating 
its trace, in order to avoid all propagation until 
one can re-act once more. The active meaning of pain 
therefore appears as an external meaning. In order 
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for pain to be judged from an active point of view 
it must be kept in the element of its exteriority. 
There is a whole art in this, an art which is that 
of the masters. The masters have a secreto They know 
that pain has only one meaning: giving pleasure to 
someone, giving pleasure to someone who inflicts or 
contemplates pain. If the active man is able not to 
take his own pain seriously it is because he always 
imagines someone to whom it gives pleasureo o o There 
is a tendeney to invoke pain as an argument against 
existence; this way of arguing testifies to a way of 
thinking which is dear to us, a reactive way. We not 
only put ourselves in the position of the one who 
suffers, but in the position of the man of 
ressentiment who no longer acts his reactions. It 
must be understood that the active meaning of pain 
appears in other perspectives: pain is not an 
argument against life, but, on the contrary, a 
stimulant to life, 'a bait for life', an argument in 
i ts favour." (Deleuze, 1983b: 12 9-3 O) . 
8. ''The signifier is the sign that has become a sign 
of the sign, the despotic _sign having replaced the 
territorial sign, having crossed the threshold of 
deterritorialization; the signifier is merely the 
deterritorialized sign itself. The sign made letter. 
Desire no longer dares to desire, having become a 
desire of desire, a desire of the despot' s desire. 
The mouth no longer speaks, it drinks the letter. 
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The eye no langer sees, it reads. The body no longer 
allows itself to be engraved like the earth, but 
prostrates itself before the engravings of the 
despot, the region beyond the earth, the new full 
body." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 206) 
9. This aspect often arouses the suspicions and 
criticisms of Deleuze' s ''romanticism'' toward 
artists. Dana Polan opens up this issue in relation 
to Deleuze' s book on Francis Bacon; and he succeeds 
in situating the problem as an inevitable writing 
practice of Deleuze. See (Polan, 1994: 229-55). 
10. The related passage reads, 
O signifier, terrible archaism of the despot where 
they still look for the empty tomb, the dead father, 
and the mystery of the name! And perhaps that is 
what incites the anger of certain linguists against 
Lacan, no less than the enthusiasm of his followers: 
the vigor and serenity with which Lacan accompanies 
the signifier back to its source, to its veritable 
origin, the despotic age, and erects an infernal 
machine that welds desire to the Law, because, 
everything considered -so Lacan thinks- this is 
indeed the form in which it produces effects of the 
signified in the unconscious (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983: 209). 
ll. These points have strongly been analyzed in a larger 
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context by Ulus Baker (1996: 32-7). 
12. Duras' relation to number, that which she calls 
''pure number'', highly connotes, from its aspect of 
''irreducibility'' to a system that will cause it; 
and thereby making itself reality itself, what 
Deleuze and Guattari calls ''numbering number.'' ''A 
nurnerical sign that is not produced by something 
outside the system of marking it institutes.'' 
This is what one finds in her essay titled "Pure 
Number'' (1997: 95-8). Her project of makiug a list 
of the now closed Renault factory workers, which 
would be the pure number designating proletariat in 
its purity, whereby, ''Reality, yet ineompared with 
this number, would be the reality of incomparable 
number; pure number, without interpretation; that 
word itself'' (translation mine). Likewise, the pure 
word ''Jew''. 
13. One can see the hypotheses in his Simulations (1983} 
and Forget Foucault (1987); which are repeated 
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